

Chapter 17

Athletics

Mention Ann Arbor, and the first image that probably comes to mind is a crisp, brilliant weekend in the fall: walking across campus through the falling leaves to Michigan Stadium; gathering at tailgate parties before the big game; the excitement of walking into that magnificent stadium—"the Big House"—with 110,000 fans thrilling to the Michigan Marching Band as they step onto the field playing "Hail to the Victors."

Intercollegiate athletics provide some of the very special moments in college life: The excitement of a traditional football rivalry such as Michigan vs. Ohio State; or, perhaps, special events such as a Rose Bowl or a NCAA Final Four. Intercollegiate athletics programs at Michigan are not only an important tradition at the University, but they also attract as much public visibility as any other University activity.

They are also a critical part of a university president's portfolio of responsibilities. As any leader of a NCAA Division I-A institution will tell you, a president ignores intercollegiate athletics only at great peril—both institutional and personal. There is an old saying in presidential circles that the university might be viewed as a very fragile academic entity, delicately balanced between the medical center at one end of the campus and the athletic department at the other. The former can sink it financially—the latter can sink it through public gaffs.

Although it is perhaps understandable that a large, successful athletic program such as Michigan would dominate the local media, it also has more far-reaching visibility. Michigan receives far more ink in the national media—the New York Times or the Washington Post or even the Wall Street Journal—for its activities on the field than it ever did for its classroom or laboratory contributions. This media exposure is due, in part, to the University's long tradition of successful athletics programs



Michigan takes the field!

of high integrity. It also stems from the increasingly celebrity character of college sports: successful and quotable coaches such as Bo Schembechler, flamboyant players such as the Fab Five, the extraordinary scale of Michigan athletics, with a football stadium averaging 112,000 spectators a game.

However the popularity of Michigan athletics is a two-edged sword. While it certainly creates great visibility for the University—after each Rose Bowl or Final Four appearance, the number of applications for admission surges—it also has a very serious potential for instability. Every college athletic department, no matter how committed and vigilant its leadership, nevertheless can depend on an occasional misstep. After all, most college student-athletes are still in their teens; the great popularity of college sports attracts all hangers-on to key programs, some well-intentioned, some not; there is intense pressure from the sports media; and the NCAA rulebook is larger and more complex than the United States Tax Code.

Perhaps far more serious is the extraordinary emo-

tional attachment that ordinarily rational people can develop toward college sports—at least toward successful programs. We have all seen how fans behave at sporting events—not simply cheering the favored team on, but taunting the opposition, berating officials, and even occasionally booing their own players and coaches. And for many, this emotional involvement extends far beyond simply the moment of athletic competition. After a series of disappointing seasons, boosters and alumni are not only likely to call for the firing of the coach, but for the athletic director and the president as well. Why not get rid of the whole @#\$%& bunch?! And their one-dimensional view of the university through their sports binoculars is not only conveyed to other fans, but to legislators and regents as well—folks who have the power and sometimes the inclination to do really serious damage!

Corner any university president in a candid moment, and he or she will admit that many of the problems they have with the various internal and external constituencies of the university stem from athletics. Whether it is an appropriate concern about program integrity, or a booster-driven pressure for team success, or media pressure, or over-involvement by trustees, presidents are frequently placed in harm's way by athletics. As a result, whether they like it or not, most presidents learn quickly that they must become both knowledgeable and actively involved in their athletics programs. As Peter Flawn, former president of the University of Texas, put it in his wonderful "how-to" book on university leadership, "If you don't like or understand college football, learn how to fake it".

1960s

Far more histories have been written about Michigan athletics than have been written about the University itself. The names of Michigan's sports heroes—Yost, Crisler, Harmon—are better known than any members of Michigan's distinguished faculty or its presidents. Tellingly, most of these histories have been written by sportswriters, former athletic directors, coaches, or fans. Hence it seems both appropriate and amusing to provide a brief historical corrective from the perspective of a long time faculty member (JD).

Although the legends of the good old days of

Michigan athletics make enjoyable reading, my purpose is better served by beginning somewhat later, in the mid-1960s, when Michigan athletics, and college sports more generally, began their mad dash toward the cliff of commercialization. During today's heady times of national championships and lucrative television and licensing contracts, Michigan fans sometimes forget that the University's athletics programs have not always been so dominant. During the 1960s, the Michigan football program had fallen on hard times, with typical stadium attendance averaging 60,000 to 70,000 per game (about two-thirds the capacity of Michigan Stadium). Michigan State University, just up the road, drew most of the attention with its powerful football teams—actually, this was part of its president's strategy to transform Michigan Agricultural College into a major university. Furthermore, student interest on activist campuses such as Michigan's had shifted during the 1960s from college athletics to political activism, with great causes such as racial discrimination and an unpopular war in Vietnam to protest.

There were, nevertheless, a few bright spots in Michigan's athletic fortunes. Michigan's basketball team had enjoyed considerable success in the mid-1960s, with Cazzie Russell leading the team to the NCAA championship game, only to lose to an upstart UCLA team (which would then dominate the sport for the next decade). Largely as a consequence of this success, the University used student-fee-financed bonds to build a new basketball arena, Crisler Center, named after former football coach and athletic director Fritz Crisler. Actually, this facility was also known to many as simply "the house that Cazzie built."

Some of Michigan's other athletics programs were also successful. The ice hockey team won the national championship in 1964. Swimming began what was to become a three-decade long domination of the Big Ten Conference. There were considerable accomplishments in other sports such as wrestling, track, and gymnastics. But, at Michigan, football was king, and when the football fortunes were down, students and fans were apathetic about Michigan athletics.

This began to change in the late 1960s. Although many attribute Michigan's turnaround to a new athletic director, Don Canham, reputed to be the shrewd marketing genius who transformed Michigan athletics



Don Canham, defining the AD Czar

into a commercial juggernaut, most of us on the faculty saw the situation somewhat different. Following the advice of the former football coach Bump Elliot, Canham recruited a talented young football coach, Bo Schembechler, who revitalized the Michigan program in his first year, beating Ohio State and going to the Rose Bowl. The sports scene in southeastern Michigan strongly supports winners, and within a couple of years, Michigan Stadium began to sell out on a regular basis. It doesn't take a rocket scientist—or a Michigan faculty member, for that matter—to realize that if one can regularly fill the largest football stadium in the country with paying customers, prosperity and success soon follow. And indeed it did, since year after year Michigan fielded nationally ranked football teams.

The annual matchup between Michigan and Ohio State, often personified as a battle between Bo Schembechler and Woody Hayes, soon grew to mythical proportions. Fans experienced some initial frustration because of a Big Ten Conference rule, which allowed only the conference champion to compete in a bowl game, the Rose Bowl. However the quality of the Michigan and Ohio State teams during the early 1970s soon forced the Big Ten to relax this rule, and Michigan began to add a bowl game to its schedule every year.

To be sure, Canham was inventive. He began to



Coach Bo Schembechler

market Michigan football in sophisticated ways. For instance, he arranged for planes to pull banners advertising Michigan football over Detroit Tiger Stadium during the 1968 World Series. He launched the practice of mass-mailed advertising and catalogs of souvenir items. Michigan athletics began to function more as a business, complete with marketing, advertising, and promotion, along with the development of new commercial activities. To many, Canham became the stereotype of the athletic director CEO-czar who would drive college sports into a commercial entertainment industry.

1970s-1980s

During the 1970s and 1980s, for all intents and purposes, Michigan athletics was a one-sport program. Football ruled the roost, and other sports were clearly secondary priorities. Taking a more objective look at this era, one cannot help but note that while several of the men's programs competed effectively within the Big Ten Conference, none were regarded as national leaders. In fact, Michigan went twenty-five years without a national championship in any sport, from 1964 when Al Renfrew's hockey team won the national championship until 1989 when Steve Fisher's basketball team won the

Final Four. Even the football team, generally nationally ranked during the season, always fell short by season's end, either losing to Ohio State in the season finale or in its annual bowl appearance.

While Michigan's leadership in commercializing college sports was successful in generating new revenues, this was not viewed as particularly beneficial to the University's image and reputation, at least by the faculty. The Athletic Department's increasing autonomy largely eliminated any substantive role of the faculty in governing intercollegiate athletics. While other universities moved rapidly to introduce varsity programs for women, Michigan remained largely fossilized in a prehistoric state of football-dominated men's sports. In fact, in 1976, Michigan became a test case for gender discrimination in intercollegiate athletics under Title IX of the Higher Education Act.

Although in theory the athletic director reported directly to the president, Canham resented any higher authority, further bolstering the perception of the Athletic Department as an independent entity. Canham was also autocratic, both in his management of the Athletic Department and in his efforts to keep both faculty and the University administration far away from influence or control. But financial and structural factors also led to this separation. The financial independence of the Athletic Department, due almost entirely to Schembechler's success in filling Michigan Stadium on football weekends in the fall, led to a mindset within the Department that it was administratively separate from the rest of the University and therefore not subject to the rules and policies governing other units. Although criticized from time to time over for the increasing independence and commercialism of Michigan athletics, Canham usually shrugged it off, pointing to Schembechler's winning football teams and the department's financial health.

The Athletic Department routinely ignored University regulations and policies concerning personnel, financial accountability, and conflict of interest. And, most significantly, the vast gulf between the Athletic Department and the University isolated student-athletes from academic life and coaches and staff from the rest of the University community. This unusual degree of independence led to scandal in the 1980s. The University experienced one of its most serious rules viola-

tion in its modern history, with a major scandal in the baseball program involving slush funds, illegal payments to players, and recruiting violations.

Although Michigan had long had a reputation for successful programs with high integrity, there were warnings as early as the 1960s about systemic flaws in its Athletic Department. Perhaps most serious was the strong autonomy of the department, which used its proclaimed financial independence to skirt the usual regulations and policies of the university and operate according to its own rules and objectives, usually out of sight and out of mind of the university administration. The "Michigan model," in which the revenues from the football program—due primarily to the gate receipts generated by the gigantic Michigan Stadium—would support all other athletic programs, would eventually collapse, as the need to add additional programs (e.g., women's sports), coupled with an unwillingness to control expenditures, led to financial disaster by the late 1990s. But perhaps a more serious threat to institutional integrity was a shift in recruiting philosophy during the 1960s, away from recruiting students who were outstanding athletes to recruiting, instead, outstanding athletes with marginal academic ability, athletes who would "major in eligibility" so that they could compete. While this generated winning programs, particularly in football and basketball, it would eventually erode the integrity of the department and lead to scandal in later years.

By the 1980s, it became clear that the days of the czar athletic director and the independent Athletic Department were coming to an end. Intercollegiate athletics activities are simply too visible and have too great an impact on the university to be left entirely to the direction of the athletics establishment, its values, and its culture. Both Harold Shapiro and I faced the challenge of reining in the excesses of the Athletic Department during the days of two particularly powerful figures, athletic director Don Canham and football coach Bo Schembechler, both of whom were media celebrities adept at building booster and press support for their personal agendas. Despite considerable resistance, Shapiro successfully negotiated Canham's retirement.

As provost, I reestablished control of admissions and academic eligibility for student athletes. But the high visibility of Michigan athletics and the myth of



The new AD: Bo Schembechler
(and also still football coach)

its financial wealth and autonomy would continue to haunt the university for years to come. This vast separation between Michigan athletics and the rest of the University posed a real challenge. It was depriving student-athletes of many of the important experiences that should have been part of their education. So too, it placed coaches in the awkward position of being decoupled from the rest of the institution. Indeed, the Athletic Department itself was highly compartmentalized, with coaches and athletes in one program having little interaction with those in others. Both Anne and I decided to take on as a personal challenge the task of “mainstreaming” Michigan athletics. This was probably a more natural effort for us than many realized. We had both been actively involved in sports. Anne had been a cheerleader in high school—the only “sport” available for girls in our small country school. And I had played football at Yale. Furthermore, our daughter Kathy had been a varsity athlete in college, competing in the heptathlon and crew. Hence we had an appreciation for both the importance of sports to the education of students and the importance of athletics to the University. It also seemed to us that there was an important symbolism associated with the Provost, the chief academic officer of the university, taking on this role; it made a strong statement that athletics should be strongly related to the academic nature of the university.



Jack Weidenbach: Second in Command under Bo
and then Michigan’s Athletic Director

We began by arranging events that brought together student-athletes and coaches in various academic settings—museums, concert halls, and such. We wanted to stress that student-athletes were students first, and that coaches were, in reality, teachers. In the process of arranging and hosting these events, we began to realize that the isolation among sports programs was just as serious as the chasm between the Athletic Department and the rest of the University. Students and coaches enjoyed the opportunity to meet participants from other sports programs. We also began to build personal relationships with coaches and Athletic Department staff, both through attending events and by meeting with them individually. For example, even while I was Provost, we began to attend the annual Football Bust held to honor the football team following each season, an event we would continue to attend regularly throughout our presidency.

Our efforts to strengthen relationships with student-athletes, coaches, and staff of the Athletic Department led to some strong friendships, among them Bo Schembechler. In fact, Bo made it a point to show up at my public interview for president. When the papers reported my selection by the Regents the next day, whose picture should be on the front page but Bo’s, with the quote: “He was my choice!”

When I became president of the University in 1988,

it was clear that steps needed to be taken to address many of these concerns. The high degree of public exposure of the University's athletics programs was a double-edged sword that both advanced and damaged the institution. As a former college football player, I had some understanding of both the challenges and opportunities of intercollegiate athletics, including the difficulty in balancing the values and cultures of academics and competitive athletics. Apart from my own personal experience with college sports, changes at the conference and NCAA level required presidents to play a far more active role in intercollegiate athletics. The NCAA had adopted a fundamental principle that institutional control and accountability of athletics rested with the presidents.

An additional complication arose from the incorporation of the Big Ten Conference during the 1980s, with the university presidents serving as its board of directors. This new corporate conference structure demanded both policy and fiduciary oversight by the presidents, frequently in direct conflict with the athletic directors. It also demanded a great deal of time and effort, since the operations of the Big Ten Conference are more extensive than those of the professional athletic leagues. Many were the lonely, invisible battles I fought for the university on such issues as sharing football gate revenue, conference expansion, and gender equity. Some were won. Some were lost. But most battles were unseen, unrecognized, and certainly unappreciated.

While such an active presidential role clearly provided additional powers to restore and maintain the integrity of Michigan athletics, it was sometimes not well understood or accepted by the old guard. Yet I was not alone in my belief that the Athletic Department needed to be brought back into the mainstream of University life.

1990s

From the beginning it was clear that Bo Schembechler would not only be an important factor, but that he also must be considered as a serious candidate to succeed Don Canham. However, we realized it would be very difficult for any mortal to hold both the jobs of head football coach and athletics director. A long-serving and well-liked stalwart of the University, Associate Vice

President for Business and Finance, Jack Weidenbach, was asked to serve as associate athletics director and handle the detailed management of the Department while Bo was involved in coaching duties. Jack was an outstanding choice. When Bo decided that he wanted to step down from the athletics directorship after serving only a year, I faced the challenge of selecting and getting regental approval for his successor. The haste of Bo's decision proved a certain advantage, since there was no time to conduct a full search. I asked Jack Weidenbach to serve as athletics director, with the support of the Board of Regents.

Both Jack and I believed that college athletics were facing a period of significant change at the national and conference level. We believed a close relationship between the athletics director and the president was critical if Michigan was to play a leadership role during this period. I also was convinced that Michigan would be at some risk if it had to endure the uncertainty and loss of momentum associated with another search for an athletics director.

The Weidenbach era experienced years of both extraordinary success and great progress for Michigan athletics. There is no other five-year period in the history of Michigan athletics programs with more conference championships, bowl wins, Final Four appearances, and All-Americans—both athletic and academic. In addition, the financial structure of Michigan athletics was stabilized, its physical plant was rebuilt, and the coaches and student-athletes were more clearly integrated into the broader life of the campus community.

Unfortunately, Jack was already close to retirement when he agreed to provide leadership for the Athletic Department. Although there were several of the top athletic directors in the country available for Jack's successor, the booster crowd got wind of the possibility that a "non-Michigan man" would be selected and began to apply pressure on the Regents to force the administration to look inside the Department for a successor.

I finally concluded that it was simply too dangerous to the University to continue the external search. Instead, with the support of the search committee, I asked an insider, Joe Roberson, then Director of the Campaign for Michigan, to accept an appointment.



An interesting first year in the presidency: a Rose Bowl win over USC and a NCAA Championship in basketball. It was all downhill after that.



Joe Roberson, another Michigan stalwart, becomes Athletic Director.

Joe's name had been considered early in the search, but his role as the director of the University's billion-dollar fund-raising campaign was felt to be more important.

Roberson's appointment was a surprise to outsiders. He was, however, a former college athlete and professional baseball player. More important, he had served as both dean and interim chancellor of the UM-Flint campus. He was an individual of great integrity, with a strong sense of academic values. Beyond his strong and wise leadership of the department, his long experience with students and academic life as a faculty member and academic leader enabled him to elevate the importance of students as students first and athletes second, in priority, even in a highly competitive program such as Michigan. Certainly Joe Roberson had a better understanding of the mission and culture of an academic institution than any athletic director of his era. Joe was also an excellent manager, and when he was finally pushed out by my successor, he left the Athletics Department in outstanding financial condition with reserves of over \$33 million.

Working closely with the sequence of athletic directors who succeeded Canham—Bo Schembechler, Jack Weidenbach, and Joe Roberson—my administration took a series of actions in the late 1980s and 1990s to better align athletics with the academic priorities of

the University. We tried to ensure that student-athletes received the same educational and extracurricular opportunities as other Michigan students. Coaches were provided with more encouragement for their roles as teachers and more security as staff members. We developed clear policies in a number of areas including admissions, academic standing, substance abuse, and student behavior that were consistent with the rest of the University.

At the same time, we took a series of steps to secure the financial integrity of Michigan athletics. The Athletic Department began to apply cost-containment methods to its operations, and a major fund-raising program was launched. The department developed more sophisticated methods for licensing. Finally, the University invested in major improvements in the athletics facilities, including rebuilding Michigan Stadium (returning to natural grass and repairing the stadium infrastructure) and new facilities for swimming, gymnastics, ice hockey, tennis, track, and new fields for women's soccer, field hockey, and softball.

During this period the University finally began to take women's athletics seriously by providing women with the same opportunities for varsity competition as men. Major investments were made in existing women's programs as well as in the addition of new programs (women's soccer and women's rowing). In fact, despite decades of neglect, Michigan became one of the first major universities in the nation to make a public commitment to achieving full gender equity in intercollegiate athletics by the late 1990s.

There were also improvements in Michigan's overall competitiveness. While once Michigan had been content to be successful primarily in a single sport, football, during the 1990s it began to compete at the national level across its full array of 23 varsity programs. It began to rank each year among the top institutions nationwide for the national all-sports championship (the Sears Trophy). During the decade from 1988 to 1998, Michigan went to five Rose Bowls and won a national championship (1997) in football; three Final Fours and a national championship (1989) in men's basketball; and four hockey Final Fours and two NCAA championships in ice hockey (1996 and 1998). Michigan teams won over 50 Big 10 championships during this period, dominating the Big Ten in men's and women's swim-



Bollinger enjoyed the thrill of riding in the 1997 championship parade, but his attempt to place a “Halo” on Michigan Stadium fell flat.

ming (including winning the NCAA championship in men’s swimming), men’s and women’s cross-country, women’s gymnastics, men’s and women’s track, and women’s softball. Michigan athletes provided some of the most exciting moments in Michigan’s long sports tradition, including two Heisman trophies (Desmond Howard and Charles Woodson) and a number of Olympians.

The heightened public visibility of Michigan athletics, particularly in the marquee sports of football and men’s basketball, accompanied by the ever-escalating expectations on the part of Michigan fans, put great pressure on both coaches and players alike. After five Big Ten championships in a row and the entrance of Penn State into the conference, the football team experienced a series of mediocre seasons (although “mediocre” for Michigan meant winning only eight or nine games a season and appearing in only a second-tier holiday bowl). In basketball, although Steve Fisher managed to continue to recruit top talent after the Fab Five, his teams never were able to win the Big Ten championship or return to the Final Four. Each misstep by a student athlete or coach, the inevitable defeats that characterize every leading program in off years or the loss of a key recruit resulted in a torrent of adverse media coverage. The sports media, which had been strong Michigan boosters during the championship years, were now viciously critical of these same programs and coaches as they struggled through occasionally mediocre seasons. The unrealistic expectations of Michigan

fans, coupled with the ruthless criticism of the sports media, soon pushed both Michigan football and basketball to the crisis point.

For a brief moment the sun shone on Michigan, with a national championship in 1997 for Lloyd Carr’s football team with an undefeated season and a victory over Washington State in the Rose Bowl (although Nebraska tied for the national championship with Michigan). The new administration embraced the event, and President Bollinger perched royally in a horse-drawn carriage in the Ann Arbor parade to celebrate the team, inoring, of course, that both the appointment of Carr and the development of the team had been accomplished by Joe Roberson.

2000s

It didn’t take long for Lee Bollinger to agree with the Regents to push out Joe Roberson as Athletic Director and hire Tom Goss, an executive with a soft drink company in California, who had been a former football player at Michigan. And Goss, in turn, moved rapidly to fire Steve Fisher in the wake of the investigation of the relationship between Chris Webber and a Detroit gambler, Eddie Martin. Of course there was no evidence of any wrong doing on Webber’s part at this stage, and there never has been any indication that Fisher was as fault as coach. But the Regents were determined for change, and both Bollinger and Goss took their marching orders.



Brandon took another course by attempting to add a “wow” factor to football with fireworks night games, dining, and a gigantic video sign to advertise (and distract drivers by the stadium).

But things soon began to go downhill. Goss appointed Fisher’s assistant basketball coach as his successor, who was clearly unqualified for the post, and the team rapidly collapsed. The financials of the Athletics Department were mismanaged and deficits began to appear, a first for Michigan. In fact, Bollinger agreed to put in \$3 million from his “president’s fund” (whatever that was) to plug the dike (or to make Bo happy, as some rumored). But Goss was a goner after another push from the Regents.

In searching for a successor, Bollinger tried to find an insider to do the job but after a couple probes without success, he was approached Bill Martin, a local real estate developer, who offered his services. Although Martin had chaired a special committee to assess the financials of the Athletics Department after losses began to appear, his own experience was questionable. To be sure, he was a member of the U.S. Olympic Committee, but his sport was yachting, not college sports. He was a business man and a real estate developer, and his goal was to embark on a massive renovation of Michigan Stadium to install skyboxes and premium facilities (dining, entertaining) characteristic of professional venues, financed by a dramatic increase in ticket prices and premium payments (“seat license” fees for the privileges to purchase season tickets in prime locations) that would support both the stadium renovation and the Department. Although this was highly controversial since it would essentially price Michigan football be-

yond levels affordable by most students, faculty, staff, townspeople, and long-time fans, transforming the stadium crowd into the high roller (or obsessed) fans characteristic of a professional franchise, Bollinger, his successor Mary Sue Coleman, and the Regents nodded their approval, and it was off to the races. The Michigan Stadium project moved ahead, and ticket prices soared...from \$25 per game to \$75 plus the seat tax...to the point today where the average ticket price, including seat tax, is now \$230 per game, and even student tickets are \$50 per game, both the highest in the nation. Martin’s experience as a real estate developer, builder, and businessman were strongly in evidence.

But Martin’s inexperience with college sports soon began to show. He hired a new basketball coach, Tommy Amaker, who had all the right credentials, smart, talented, and former player at Duke, but all the wrong cultural characteristics to handle the Big Ten. Amaker was soon replaced by John Belein from West Virginia, and Amaker went onto success at Harvard.

But football became the Achilles heel. Whether pushed or pulled, Lloyd Carr stepped down after a long and successful tenure as football coach, and Martin launched a search that ended up with Rich Rodriguez, a successful coach at West Virginia, but a total misfit at Michigan, where both his personal style (about as anti-academic as one could find) and his flawed approach to Big Ten football left the team in a shambles, with losing seasons and strong fan disapproval. By this time, Mar-



Athletic Director David Brandon

tin's "my way or the highway" business approach to athletic leadership had worn thin, so he stepped down after ten years.

But if Martin was misaligned for athletic director, his successor, Dave Brandon, was even further removed, coming to the post from a career in advertising and serving as a former Regent of the University. Brandon did have some experience with Michigan athletics. He was walk-on quarterback for Schembechler in the 1980s, although he only made it into one game. Bo helped him get a job afterward with a large Detroit advertising company, and when Domino's Pizza was acquired by Bain Capital, they named him CEO where his marketing and advertising skills were valued.

Since Brandon had been instrumental in hiring Mary Sue Coleman when he was a Regent, nobody was particularly surprised when he was hired as Athletic Director. After all, he left Domino's with over \$200 million in stock, and he had a strong passion for Michigan athletics. Unfortunately his background was in marketing, with no experience in managing college sports, so that is the tact that he took, pushing out over 100 long-standing employees and replacing them with 200 new staff who were directed to "build the brand" of Michigan athletics and add the "Wow" factor to market it to the world. He moved quickly to fire Rodriguez, but strangely replaced him with an obscure coach, Brady Hoke, from San Diego State, who continued the malaise in the football program.

Ignoring the poor performance of the football pro-

Returning Michigan Athletics to the People...



- Providing 25,000 students with free tickets to every game (cost: \$7.4 million)
- Removing the seat license fee from all bleacher seats in the stadium (cost: \$5 million)
- Reducing ticket prices for all bleacher seats to \$50 (cost: \$7.5 million)
- Retaining current pricing for all premium seating and skyboxes (no cost)
- Reducing athletic personnel by 100 staff (savings: \$15 million)
- Reducing excessive coaches and AD salaries (savings: \$6 million)

A simple proposal for opening up Michigan Stadium once again to the "common man"



gram that was generating the revenue, Brandon continued to raise ticket prices and take on more debt with projects such as the renovation of the Crisler Arena (now renamed "Center") to resemble more of a department store with numerous shops along the entrances and concourses and a proposed \$300 million investment in new facilities for the non-revenue sports. Advertising became the name of the game, with gigantic video displays not only inside Michigan Stadium but also outside to lure (and, more likely, district) drivers as they approached the stadium. As the financial data indicates, the expenditures rose by over 50% during the Brandon years, mostly to fuel the rapid expansion of staffing (particularly in the marketing area) and debt service. Perhaps it is no surprise that student support increased by only 10% during this period, clearly reflecting the new priorities.

Faculty influence was also essentially eliminated, since as chair of the faculty Advisory Board on Intercollegiate Athletics, Brandon was able to schedule meetings of limited consequence. Furthermore, since few faculty members could afford the new ticket prices, they rapidly became disengaged with Michigan athletics, treating it largely with benign neglect.

Despite growing criticism from members of the University and Ann Arbor community who were priced out of Michigan football, basketball, and hockey events, Brandon was determined to continue his focus on elevating both the Michigan brand and its pricing, while aggressively pushing private fund raising in competi-



	FY07	FY08	FY09	FY10	FY11	FY12	FY13
Salaries	\$26,845	\$28,873	\$30,860	\$33,958	\$35,703	\$39,204	\$44,235
Students	\$14,411	\$14,061	\$15,129	\$15,734	\$16,206	\$17,293	\$18,348
Team/Game	\$13,171	\$13,871	\$15,005	\$15,791	\$16,925	\$18,109	\$19,053
Facilities	\$6,614	\$7,264	\$7,093	\$7,580	\$8,148	\$9,834	\$10,620
Def Main	\$4,500	\$4,500	\$4,500	\$4,500	\$4,500	\$4,500	\$4,500
Other OpAd	\$6,368	\$6,878	\$6,575	\$5,923	\$6,723	\$7,674	\$13,073
Debt Service	\$2,575	\$2,565	\$1,029	\$2,139	\$11,254	\$13,200	\$14,688
	\$74,474	\$78,012	\$80,191	\$85,625	\$100,307	\$109,835	\$124,517
	FY07	FY08	FY09	FY10	FY11	FY12	FY13
Tickets	\$34,071	\$38,642	\$35,551	\$37,714	\$38,193	\$45,588	\$44,051
Big 10	\$13,467	\$17,267	\$17,419	\$18,305	\$20,226	\$21,948	\$23,283
Seat Tax	\$13,896	\$15,138	\$13,600	\$13,600	\$20,972	\$26,153	\$27,416
Corporate	\$5,698	\$8,065	\$11,980	\$13,760	\$14,021	\$14,328	\$15,050
Facility Rent	\$1,908	\$1,934	\$1,870	\$1,774	\$1,743	\$1,825	\$6,847
Licensing	\$4,444	\$2,221	\$3,800	\$4,100	\$4,100	\$4,774	\$5,650
Investment	\$5,320	\$4,207	\$3,444	\$2,345	\$2,700	\$6,602	\$8,025
	\$83,926	\$93,658	\$90,461	\$94,449	\$105,038	\$121,218	\$130,322



While the expenditures of the Athletics Department have almost doubled over the past seven year (driven tickets and seat taxes), most of this revenue has gone to salaries and not students.



The Michigan Marching Band apparently understood where Michigan football was headed!

tion with the rest of the University. Michigan Athletics became increasingly a commercial entertainment company marketing to primarily to the wealthy and effectively severed from the University.

Yet this strategy exploded in 2014, when a tragic incident occurred when the football coaches allowed clearly injured quarterback to remain in a game with a concussion. The intense national exposure to this incident, shown live on a national television broadcast of the game, together with the growing frustration about Brandon's effort to sever the relationships with the University and the community through excessive ticket pricing and restrictive policies, finally exploded into calls for his firing. After performing extensive due diligence through discussions with many different perspectives, the University's new president, Mark Schlissel, concluded that Brandon's reign must come to an end, and he negotiated his "resignation" (at a cost of \$3 million due to the excessive contract provided Brandon by Coleman early in his tenure).

Over the past 20 years, Michigan has had three different athletic directors, characterized by zero experience with college sports. And over that period both the quality and the character of Michigan athletics have clearly deteriorated. Needless to say, the "leaders and best" have become anything but...

Of course, one could always blame this on the presidents, as many do for other areas of institutional performance. But here it is important to realize that building a competitive athletics program requires many years, so that its performance under one president can usually be attributed to the era of one's predecessor. For example, my experience in having both a Rose Bowl champion and NCAA basketball champion my first year, benefited enormously from the development of these programs during Harold Shapiro's era. (Although in this case, some credit might be accepted for the effort that Anne and I invested, while serving as provost, in building stronger relationships with both coaches and student-athletes, perhaps symbolized best by Coach Bo

Schembechler's presence at my selection as president to announce, "He was my choice!") In a similar sense, the national championship won by the football program during Lee Bollinger's first year as president was certainly not to his administration, but rather to the leadership of AD Joe Roberson, Coach Lloyd Carr, and many others during my years.

Of course, eventually the credit or blame for the success or failure of an athletics program over many years must rest with the president during those years, as evidenced by the unfortunate decline of Michigan athletics during the first decade of the 21st century.

Lessons Learned

It is appropriate to conclude this chapter with some very personal and candid comments about the future of college sports, at least at the level of the University of Michigan. After four decades as a college athlete, a faculty member, provost and president of the University of Michigan, and member and chair of the Presidents' Council of the Big Ten Conference, I have arrived at several conclusions:

First, while most of intercollegiate athletics are both valuable and appropriate activities for our universities, big-time college football and basketball stand apart, since they have clearly become commercial entertainment businesses. Today they have little if any relevance to the academic mission of the university. Furthermore, they are based on a culture, a set of values that, while perhaps appropriate for show business, are viewed as highly corrupt by the academy and deemed corrosive to our academic mission.

Second, while I believe that one can make a case for relevance of college sports to our educational mission to the extent that they provide a participatory activity for our students, I can find no compelling reason why American universities should conduct intercollegiate athletics programs at the current highly commercialized, professionalized level of big-time college football and basketball simply for the entertainment of the American public, the financial benefit of coaches, athletic directors, conference commissioners, and NCAA executives, and the profit of television networks, sponsors, and sports apparel manufacturers.

If you think about it for a moment, you will real-

ize there are only three reasons why a university would want to conduct big-time college sports: i) because it benefits the student-athletes; ii) because it benefits the university (reputation, community, revenue; and iii) because it benefits the larger community. It is my belief that big-time college football and basketball, as currently conducted, fail to meet any of these criteria.

Third, and most significantly, it is my growing conviction that big-time college sports do far more damage to the university, to its students and faculty, its leadership, its reputation and credibility, that most realize—or at least are willing to admit. The evidence seems overwhelming:

- Far too many of our athletics programs exploit young people, recruiting them with the promise of a college education—or a lucrative professional career—only to have the majority of Division I-A football and basketball players achieve neither.
- Scandals in intercollegiate athletics have damaged the reputations of many of our colleges and universities.
- Big time college football and basketball have put inappropriate pressure on university governance, as boosters, politicians, and the media attempt to influence governing boards and university leadership.
- The impact of intercollegiate athletics on university culture and values has been damaging, with inappropriate behavior of both athletes and coaches, all too frequently tolerated and excused.
- So too, the commercial culture of the entertainment industry that characterizes college football and basketball is not only orthogonal to academic values, but it is corrosive and corruptive to the academic enterprise

Some Myths and Realities of College Sports

Myth 1: Intercollegiate athletics are self-supporting.

Reality: No college programs in America today cover all their expenses (even those who claim to such USC, U Texas, Ohio State, Michigan, and even Notre Dame). Athletic directors use flakey accounting methods that do not include full costs of capital expenditures, hidden subsidies such as instate tuition for out-



The disparity between expenditures per student on athletics (upper curve) and academics (lower curves) continues to diverge, particularly in the leading confences and institutions.

of-state athletes, indirect costs born by the institution, fund-raising that competes with academic units, and, of course, the strange legislation that inserted a tax loop-hole that treats skybox rent and seat taxes as charitable “education” deductions. The NCAA estimates that in 2009 the total costs for intercollegiate athletics was \$10.5 billion, while the total revenue was \$5.6 billion (including ticket sales, television broadcasting, licensing, etc.). In reality the only people who make money –and big-time money, at that– from big time athletics are the coaches, athletic directors, NCAA brass, and the networks. But certainly not the “student athletes” and certainly not their host institutions.

In 2012 the media budget deficits for NCAA Division 1 programs averaged \$9 million per year. From 2005 to 2009 athletics departments increased spending on student athletes by 50%, to \$91,050 per athlete, while the increase for normal students was 20% to \$13,470 per student.

Myth 2: Intercollegiate athletics are important for fund raising.

Reality: Donors who give because of winning teams give to winning programs, not to academic activities. But it gets even worse, since the tax-benefited “premium” payments for skyboxes and preferred seating generally come out of gifts that would otherwise have gone to academic purposes. At Michigan, our largest donors

could not care less about college sports! They view it largely as a distraction from the primary mission of the University (except for Steve Ross, of course, who gave \$100 million to the Athletics Department in 2013 to help build a “Walk of Champions”, whatever that is).

Myth 3: All athletic facilities are self-financed.

Reality: Actually most athletic facilities require either institutional or public subsidy. But even those that are debt financed must pledge student tuition revenue for borrowing equity, not anticipated gate receipts or television revenue. They also depend on questionable tax practices counting fees such as skybox leases and seat taxes as 80% “charitable” deductions by the IRS despite the fact that they are *quid pro quo* required payments for benefits such as premium seating. If these tax loopholes disappear, many of the big stadium projects will collapse like a house of cards.

Myth 4: The power of the NCAA will protect the status quo.

Reality: Today the NCAA is in serious trouble and fighting for its survival. Its tax status is dependent upon rulings long ago that its primary purpose is educational. Yet grants-in-aid based on athletic performance could be ruled as “pay for play” and hence require employment rights for athletes (including unionization). The O’Bannon case could require payment to players for

the use of their images for commercial purposes. Litigation associated with brain injuries or long-term health impact could cripple both the NCAA and universities. Finally, the compensation of coaches (\$5 M and up), athletic directors (\$1 M and up), and athletic staff (now several times that of faculty) is now so extreme that it raises the threat of federal action.

Myth 5: Intercollegiate athletics is important for school spirit.

Reality: Sure, student applications do go up after a major championship. But the students attracted to an institution are not necessarily those most concerned about academic achievement. Instead, they come “*paying for the party*”...the title of a recent book on college life. Besides, how important is athletics to the school spirit of institutions like Harvard, Yale...and Caltech? And how important is athletics to Penn State these days?

Myth 6: But we do pay student athletes! We give them valuable scholarships!

Reality: A quote from a recent book on college sports by Taylor Branch, the great historian of civil rights in America, puts this in an interesting context.

“‘Scholarship athletes are already paid,’ declared the Knight Commission members, ‘in the most meaningful way possible: with a free education.’ This evasion by prominent educators severed my last reluctant, emotional tie with imposed amateurism. I found it worse than self-serving. It echoes masters who once claimed that heavenly salvation would outweigh earthly injustice to slaves.”

Myth 7: But we are preparing athletes for professional careers.

Reality: A recent Michigan survey indicates that most student athletes realize their odds of making the pros are very remote. Instead they view their college experience as an opportunity to enter careers very similar to other students in fields such as business, law, and medicine. But after a few weeks on campus, many of the most vigorously recruited student athletes realize they are woefully academically unprepared and saddled with 50-60 hour/week “jobs” and lives controlled by coaches. Hence they are forced to shift to “major-

ing in eligibility”, enrolling in cupcake majors (sports management, communications, general studies). The attrition rates are tragic, with 6-year graduate rates: less than 50% for football; 40% for basketball. Even those who graduate frequently have meaningless degrees (e.g., recreational sports, golf-course management).

What to do? The Traditional Approach

It doesn’t take a rocket scientist (although that happens to be my background) to see what has to be done to re-establish the primacy of educational over commercial values in college sports:

Freshman Ineligibility: All freshmen in all sports should be ineligible for varsity competition. The first year should be a time for students to adjust intellectually and emotionally to the hectic pace of college life.

Financial Aid: Eliminate the “athletic scholarship” or “grant-in-aid” and replace it with need-based financial aid. Note this would not only substantially reduce the costs of college sports, but it would also eliminate the legal risks of continuing what has become, in effect, a “pay for play” system.

Mainstream Coaches: Throttle back the salaries of coaches, athletic directors, and other athletic department staff to levels comparable to faculty and other university staff. Subject coaches to the same conflict of interest policies that govern other faculty and staff (e.g., eliminating shoe contracts, prohibiting the use of the university’s name and reputation for personal gain, etc.)

Mainstream the Administration of Intercollegiate Athletics: Intercollegiate athletics is a student extracurricular activity and, as such, should report to the vice president for student affairs. Academic matters such as student eligibility, counseling, and academic support should be the responsibility of the university’s chief academic officer (e.g., the provost). Financial matters should be under the control of the university’s chief financial officer. Medical issues should be under the control of staff from the university medical center or student health service.

Financial Support: We should adopt the principle that if intercollegiate athletics are of value to students, they should be subsidized by the General and Educa-

tion budget of the university. To this end, we might consider putting athletics department salary lines (coaches and staff) on the academic budget and under the control of the provost. We could then use a counter flow of athletic department revenue into the General and Education budget to minimize the net subsidy of college sports.

Faculty control: We need to restructure faculty athletics boards so that they are no longer under control of athletic directors but instead represent true faculty participation. It is important to keep “jock” faculty off these boards and to give priority to those faculty with significant experience in undergraduate education. It is also important for faculty boards to understand and accept their responsibilities for seeing that academic priorities dominate competitive and commercial goals, while student welfare and institutional integrity are priorities.

Rigorous Independent Audits and Compliance Functions: Here we need a system for independent auditing of not simply compliance with NCAA and conference rules, but as well financial matters, student academic standing, progress toward degrees, and medical matters.

Limits on Schedules and Student Participation: We should confine all competitive schedules to a single academic term (e.g., football in fall, basketball, hockey in winter, etc.). Competitive schedules should be shortened to more reasonable levels (e.g., football back to 10 games, basketball to 20 games, etc.). We need to constrain competitive and travel schedules to be compatible with academic demands (e.g., no weekday competition). Student participation in mandatory, non-competitive athletics activities during off-season should be severely limited (including eliminating spring football practice, summer conditioning requirements, etc.).

Throttle Back Commercialization: It is time to forget about a “Final Four” Division 1-A football national championship and drastically reduce the number of post-season bowls. Perhaps we should return the NCAA Basketball Tournament to a two-week, conference champion only event. Furthermore, we need to stop this nonsense of negotiating every broadcasting contract as if dollars were the only objective and chase the sports press out of the locker rooms and lives of our students.

Of course, the first arguments launched against such reform proposals always have to do with money. College football and basketball are portrayed as the geese that lay the golden eggs for higher education. However I believe these arguments, long accepted but rarely challenged, are flawed. Essentially all intercollegiate athletic programs are subsidized, to some degree, by the academic programs of the university (when all costs are included, such as amortization of facilities and administrative overhead.) Furthermore, in the scheme of things, the budgets of these programs are quite modest relative to other institutional activities (e.g., at Michigan, the \$100 M/y budget of our athletic department is only about 2% of our total budget, and, more to the point, less than the amount of state support we have lost over the past three years!).

The current culture of college sports is driven by the belief that the team that spends the most wins the most. Not surprisingly, therefore, the more revenue athletic programs generate, the more they spend. Since most of the expenditures are in areas such as grants-in-aid, coaches and staff salaries, promotional activities, and facilities, many of the proposals in the previous section would dramatically reduce these costs. For example, replacing the current system of grants-in-aid by need-based financial aid would reduce these costs by at least a factor of two. Throttling back the extravagant level of celebrity coaches salaries (and applying conflict of interest to eliminate excessive external income and perks) would do likewise. Demanding university control of all auxiliary activities such as broadcasting and licensing so that revenue flows to the institution and not to the coaches would also help. And reducing the expenditures required to mount big-time commercial entertainment events would also reduce costs, thereby compensating for lost broadcasting revenue.

Treating Athletics Like the Rest of the University

More generally, the first step in reconnecting college sports to the academic enterprise is to stop treating our athletic departments, coaches, and student-athletes as special members of the university community, subject to different rules and procedures, policies and practices than the rest of university. The key to reform is to mainstream our athletics programs and their participants

back into the university in three key areas: financial management, personnel policies, and educational practices.

Financial management: Athletics departments should be subject to the same financial controls, policies, and procedures as other university units. Their financial operations should report directly to the chief financial officer of the university and be subject to rigorous internal audit requirements and full public disclosure as an independent (rather than consolidated) financial unit. All external financial arrangements, including those with athletic organizations (e.g., conferences and the NCAA), commercial concerns (e.g., licensing, broadcasting, endorsements), and foundation/booster organizations should be under strict university controls. In that regard, I would even suggest that we take the Sarbanes-Oxley approach, designed to eliminate abuses in the financial operations of publicly-held corporations, by requiring the Athletic Director, President, and chair of the Governing Board to sign annual financial statements and hold them legally accountable should these later be found to be fraudulent.

Possible Cost Reductions: There are many opportunities for significant cost reductions. For example, replacing the current system of grants-in-aid by need-based financial aid would reduce these costs by at least a factor of two. Throttling back the extravagant level of celebrity coaches salaries (and applying conflict of interest to eliminate excessive external income and perks) would do likewise. Demanding university control of all auxiliary activities such as broadcasting and licensing so that revenue flows to the institution and not to the coaches would also help. And reducing the expenditures required to mount big-time commercial entertainment events would also reduce costs, thereby compensating for lost broadcasting revenue.

Personnel: All athletics department staff (including coaches) should be subject to the same conflict-of-interest policies that apply to other university staff and faculty. For example, coaches should no longer be allowed to exploit the reputation of the university for personal gain through endorsements or special arrangements with commercial vendors (e.g., sports apparel companies, broadcasting, automobile dealers). Employment agreements for coaches should conform to those characterizing other staff and should be subject to review

by university financial and personnel units. All personnel searches, including those for coaches, should comply fully with the policies and practices characterizing other staff (e.g., equal opportunity)

Who Should Take the Lead in Reform

Several years ago, I received an invitation from William Friday, former president of the University of North Carolina, to testify before the Knight Commission on Intercollegiate Athletics. My book on college sports had just appeared, and they were interested in my views on this complex subject. After stating my concerns, much as I have earlier in this chapter, I went on to suggest a possible approach to reform that began with the premier academic organization, the Association of American Universities (AAU). If these institutions were to adopt a series of reforms—a disarmament treaty, if you will—for their members, much of the rest of the higher education enterprise would soon follow. It is my belief that such an effort by the AAU would propagate rather rapidly throughout other organizations such as the National Association of State Universities and Land Grant Colleges and even the American Council on Education.

I concluded my testimony by stressing the point that as higher education entered an era of great challenge and change, it was essential that we re-examine each and every one of our activities for their relevance and compatibility with our fundamental academic missions of teaching, learning, and serving society. From this perspective, it was my belief there was little justification for the American university to mount and sustain big-time football and basketball programs at their current commercial and professional level simply to satisfy the public desire for entertainment and pursue the commercial goals of the marketplace. The damage to our academic values and integrity was simply too great. If we were to retain intercollegiate athletics as an appropriate university activity, it was essential to decouple our programs from the entertainment industry and reconnect them with the educational mission of our institutions.

After I had finished my remarks, the co-chair of the commission, Father Theodore Hesburg, former president of Notre Dame, was first to respond. He thanked me (after offering a prayer: “May God have mercy on your soul!”) for not only reinforcing many of the Com-

mission concerns, but, in effect, providing a first draft of the Commission's report! Of course, others on the Commission challenged some of my more outspoken conclusions and recommendations. But in the end, my conclusions seemed to stand, as evidenced by the strong statement in the final report of the Commission:

"After digesting the extensive testimony offered over some six months, the Commission is forced to reiterate its earlier conclusion that at their worst, big-time college athletics appear to have lost their bearings. Athletics continue to threaten to overwhelm the universities in whose name they were established. Indeed, we must report that the threat has grown rather than diminished. Higher education must draw together all of its strengths and assets to reassert the primary of the educational mission of the academy. The message that all parts of the higher education community must proclaim is emphatic: Together, we created today's disgraceful environment. Only by acting together can we clean it up."

A Call to Action: Reconnecting College Sports
and Higher Education

The Knight Commission on Intercollegiate Athletics
June, 2001

Yet, in retrospect, I now believe that while both my testimony and the Knight Commission report urgently portrayed the threat to American higher education posed by the ever-increasing commercialization and corruption of big-time college sports, neither proposed an effective method to deal with the problem. In fact, a major reason why the various efforts to reform college sports over the past several decades have failed is that we continue to bet on the wrong horse. We continue propose that the university presidents take the lead in the reform of college sports, whether through academic organizations such as the AAU and ACE (my proposal) or the NCAA (the Knight Commission). And very little happens, and the mad rush toward more and more commercialism and corruption continues.

Perhaps this is not so surprising. After all, university presidents are usually trapped between a rock and a hard place: between a public demanding high quality entertainment from the commercial college sports industry they are paying for, and governing boards

who have the capacity (and all too frequently the inclination) to fire presidents who rock the university boat too strenuously. It should be clear that few contemporary university presidents have the capacity, the will, or the appetite to lead a true reform movement in college sports.

Well, what about the faculty? Of course, in the end, it is the governing faculty that is responsible for its academic integrity of a university. Faculty members have been given the ultimate protection, tenure, to enable them to confront the forces of darkness that would savage academic values. The serious nature of the threats posed to the university and its educational values by the commercialization and corruption of big-time college sports has been firmly established in recent years. It is now time to challenge the faculties of our universities, through their elected bodies such as faculty senates, to step up to their responsibility to defend the academic integrity of their institutions, by demanding substantive reform of intercollegiate athletics.

To their credit, several faculty groups have responded well to this challenge and stepped forward to propose a set of principles for the athletic programs conducted by their institutions. Beginning first in the Pac Ten Conference universities, then propagating to the Big Ten and Atlantic Coast Conferences, and most recently considered and adopted by the American Association of University Professors, such principles provide a firm foundation for true reform in college sports.

Yet the influence of the faculty has been pushed out of intercollegiate athletics by eliminating oversight boards, as athletic departments have taken over control of academic counseling (and at some institutions, even admission and academic standing), and as even faculty participation as spectators has eroded due to premium pricing of tickets, little wonder that most faculty members treat the Athletics Department with benign neglect (at least until its missteps severely damage the integrity of their institution).

What about trustees? The next obvious step in this process is for the faculties to challenge the trustees of our universities, who in the end must be held accountable for the integrity of their institutions. To be sure, there will always be some trustees who are more beholden to the football coach than to academic values. But most university trustees are dedicated volunteers

with deep commitments to their institutions and to the educational mission of the university. Furthermore, while some governing boards may inhibit the efforts of university presidents willing to challenge the sports establishment, few governing boards can withstand a concerted effort by their faculty to hold them accountable for the integrity of their institution. In this spirit, several faculty groups have already begun this phase of the process by launching a dialogue with university trustees through the Association of Governing Boards.

Ironically, it could well be that the long American tradition of shared university governance, involving public oversight and trusteeship by governing boards of lay citizens, elected faculty governance, and experienced but generally short-term and usually amateur administrative leadership, will pose the ultimate challenge to big time college sports.

After all, even if university presidents are reluctant to challenge the status quo, the faculty has been provided with the both the responsibility and the status (e.g., tenure) to protect the academic values of the university and the integrity of its education programs. Furthermore, as trustees understand and accept their stewardship for welfare of their institutions, they will recognize that their clear financial, legal, and public accountability compels them to listen and respond to the challenge of academic integrity from their faculties.

What about a rising tide of public frustration? To be sure, many of those in charge of college athletics are unable (or unwilling) to understand the minefields that lie in the path of their plans. For example, the Big Ten leadership (conference commissioner and presidents) has largely destroyed the conference, adding new institutions that fail to meet the tests of geographical location, athletic competitiveness, or academic quality. As fans begin to realize that long-standing rivalries among academic peers (e.g., Michigan vs. Wisconsin) will largely disappear to satisfy the Big Ten Network, they could well abandon any loyalty to either teams or institutions. Of course, they could be replaced by new fans with interests more akin to professional sports such as automobile racing or boxing. After all, sports remain the "opiate of the masses".

Possible "Planet Killers" for College Sports

In summary, who will protect the interests of the student athletes?

Not the coaches or ADs or NCAA. They clearly have conflicts of interests.

What about faculty? They have been pushed to the side.

What about university leaders like presidents or trustees? They clearly have abdicated all responsibility!!!

What about the government? They got us into this trouble!!!

What about...lawyers? Perhaps that is the only protection left!!!

There are still several possibilities on the horizon that could become "planet killers" for college sports as we know them today:

The federal government could finally step up to its responsibility to treat big-time athletics like other business enterprises, subjecting it to more reasonable treatment with respect to tax policy, employee treatment (meaning student-athletes), monopoly and cartel restrictions, and possibly even salary constraints.

The O'Bannon case has demonstrated that litigation may become a formidable force for changing college sports as we know it today. There are early signs that student-athletes may be given rights that protect them against exploitation by coaches and athletic departments, and others for personal gain.

But the most serious threat on the horizon is the increasing evidence of the damage that intensifying violent sports such as football, basketball, and hockey to professional levels do to the health of young athletes. In recent years, there is growing medical evidence about the long-term impact of concussions and other trauma on longer-term illness such as dementia and Alzheimers. These concerns are broadening out to explore the epidemiology of longer health impact including life expectancy (now found to be as low as 57 for NFL players). Although most attention has been focused on the health implications of competition at the high school and professional level, it is only a matter of time before college sports falls under the microscope. Beyond the concerns about the impact of violent sports on the health of student athletes, these studies are likely to

open up a Pandora's Box of litigation on issues such as institutional liability and requirements for the support of long-term health care that could financially cripple many institutions that insist on continuing to compete at the current level of intensity. In fact, the threat of litigation as class action suits could even eliminate violent sports such as football and hockey as we know them today at all but the professional levels.

A Final Observation

Today I stand among a growing number of past and current university leaders who believe that today higher education has entered an era of great challenge and change. Powerful social, economic, and technological forces are likely to change the university in very profound ways in the decades ahead. As our institutions enter this period of transformation, it is essential that we re-examine each and every one of our activities for their relevance and compatibility with our fundamental academic missions of teaching, research, and serving society.

If we are to retain intercollegiate athletics as appropriate university activities, it is essential we insist upon the primacy of academic over commercial values by decoupling our athletic programs from the entertainment industry and reconnecting them with the educational mission of our institutions.

The American university is simply too important to the future of this nation to be threatened by the ever increasing commercialization, professionalization, and corruption of college sports.

Is this a hopeless quest for change? Here I can only recall a quote from Thomas Paine's *Common Sense* (February 14, 1776) that applies to this issue:

"Perhaps the sentiments contained in these pages are not yet sufficiently fashionable to procure them general favour; a long habit of not thinking a thing wrong, gives it a superficial appearance of being right, and raises at first a formidable outcry in defense of custom. But the tumult soon subsides. Time makes more converts than reason."

Oh, yes...there is one more observation...

1985	Michigan	27	Ohio State	17	Ann Arbor
1986	Michigan	26	Ohio State	24	Columbus
1987	Michigan	20	Ohio State	23	Ann Arbor
1988	Michigan	34	Ohio State	31	Columbus
1989	Michigan	28	Ohio State	18	Ann Arbor
1990	Michigan	16	Ohio State	13	Columbus
1991	Michigan	31	Ohio State	3	Ann Arbor
1992	Michigan	13	Ohio State	13	Columbus
1993	Michigan	28	Ohio State	0	Ann Arbor
1994	Michigan	6	Ohio State	22	Columbus
1995	Michigan	31	Ohio State	23	Ann Arbor
1996	Michigan	13	Ohio State	9	Columbus
1997	Michigan	20	Ohio State	14	Ann Arbor
1998	Michigan	16	Ohio State	31	Columbus
1999	Michigan	24	Ohio State	17	Ann Arbor
2000	Michigan	38	Ohio State	26	Columbus
2001	Michigan	20	Ohio State	26	Ann Arbor
2002	Michigan	9	Ohio State	14	Columbus
2003	Michigan	35	Ohio State	21	Ann Arbor
2004	Michigan	21	Ohio State	37	Columbus
2005	Michigan	21	Ohio State	25	Ann Arbor
2006	Michigan	39	Ohio State	42	Columbus
2007	Michigan	3	Ohio State	14	Ann Arbor
2008	Michigan	7	Ohio State	42	Columbus
2009	Michigan	10	Ohio State	21	Ann Arbor
2010	Michigan	7	Ohio State	37	Columbus
2011	Michigan	40	Ohio State	34	Ann Arbor
2012	Michigan	21	Ohio State	26	Columbus
2013	Michigan	41	Ohio State	42	Ann Arbor
2014	Michigan	28	Ohio State	42	Columbus